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pay schemes among workers who have lower levels of risk aversion, greater residual control
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I. INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of employee ownership, profit sharing and other performance-based pay
schemes has been growing in the past several decades in the U.S. and other advanced economies.
According to the 2006 wave of the General Social Survey, which is a nationally representative
survey of individuals conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, over a third of U.S.
workers are covered by profit sharing, 18 percent own company stock, and 9 percent own
company stock options. Coverage is similar in France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan (Del Boca
et. al. 1999, Jones and Kato 1995). A large part of the previous research on shared capitalist pay
schemes in which employees participate in the financial performance of their place of work has
focused on the effects of such programs on worker and firm outcomes like productivity,
turnover, and profits (Craig and Pencavel 1992, Kruse and Blasi 1997, Kruse 2002, Park, Kruse
and Sesil 2004). But an important aspect that has not yet been explored is worker preferences for
different participatory compensation programs, largely due to the dearth of available datasets that
are conducive to the analysis of this subject. The current paper sheds light on this topic by
examining preferences over profit sharing, forms of employee ownership like company stock and
stock option ownership, as well as preferences over variable pay in general, and how these
preferences depend on worker risk aversion, residual control, and perceptions of co-workers and
management.
Economic theory predicts that workers will be more favorable towards performancerelated pay schemes when they: i) have low levels of risk aversion, ii) have greater control over
the work process generating payouts (residual control), iii) trust their co-workers, so that the free
rider problem associated with group incentives can be overcome by a cooperative solution, and
iv) trust their managers not to exploit information asymmetries when distributing financial
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payouts. We investigate the role that each of these factors play in workers’ preferences over
employee ownership, profit sharing and variable pay using a unique set of questions asked in the
NBER Shared Capitalism Survey of more than 40,000 employees from 14 firms.
This is a novel research area in the employee ownership literature and our findings help
to understand how workers respond to different types of participatory compensation schemes.
We consider both pay that is tied to overall company performance (profit sharing, company stock
and stock option ownership), as well as individual performance-based variable pay (individual
bonuses, commissions), and we will refer to these collectively as financial participation
throughout the paper.
A strength of our data is that we have individual-level measures of risk aversion, which is
often discussed as an important factor in financial participation but is rarely measured. The
NBER Shared Capitalism Survey additionally provides unique information on worker residual
control and worker perceptions of co-workers and management which are also central to our
analysis. We use this detailed information to investigate how preferences for different types of
financial participation are shaped by worker risk aversion, residual control, and views of coworkers and management. Our key results show that most workers want at least a part of their
compensation to be output-contingent, with stronger preferences for performance-related pay
among workers who have lower levels of risk aversion, greater residual control of the work
process, and greater trust of co-workers and managers.
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II. THEORY AND PRIOR LITERATURE
Our discussion focuses on the following theoretical factors central to perceptions about
shared capitalism and variable pay: risk aversion, residual control, and trust in co-workers and
management.
Worker preferences for employee ownership and other forms of financial participation
will reflect the perceived potential costs and benefits of such plans. Risk aversion is viewed as a
key factor in most theoretical models of pay-for-performance (Holmstrom 1979, Shavell 1979),
since the variability of rewards can represent a significant cost for risk-averse workers, and has
indeed been found to reduce preferences for output-contingent pay in laboratory experiments
(Cadsby, Song, Tapon 2007). Moreover, people with lower wealth and base salary will generally
be more averse to financial risk since they have less money for discretionary spending and a
reduction in income or assets may force them to cut back on necessities.
Attitudes towards financial participation will also depend on the perceived potential for
higher income, which will depend on worker skills and opportunities for influencing workplace
performance. Workers are likely to view group-based rewards more favorably in the presence of
practices such as employee involvement in decisions (increasing opportunities to influence
performance), training (increasing skills that contribute to performance), and job security
(providing assurance that one will be able to receive the fruits of higher performance). This can
be thought of in the context of the theory of residual returns and residual control, which argues
that those who receive residual returns (financial participation) should also receive residual
control (power over the work process) in order to provide proper incentives and achieve valuemaximizing decisions (Milgrom and Roberts 1990, Jensen and Meckling 1992, Holmstrom and
Milgrom 1994, Prendergast 2002). Several empirical studies have found support for this
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hypothesis (DeVaro and Kurtulus 2010, Ben-Ner, Kong and Lluis 2010, Foss and Laursen 2005).
Moreover, employee involvement in firm decision-making may create expectations or desires for
sharing in the fruits of those decisions, and workers may become dispirited without some sort of
financial reward tied to the consequences of those decisions (Levine and Tyson 1990, Ben-Ner
and Jones 1995).
Preferences for rewards based on company performance are also likely to critically
depend on workers’ perceptions about co-workers. The well-known free rider problem in group
incentives has been modeled as a prisoners’ dilemma game, in which each participant has an
individual incentive to shirk. If the game is repeated in an ongoing relationship, however,
several equilibria are possible, including a cooperative equilibrium in which the participants
establish a collective agreement to cooperate so that the rewards are higher for all participants
(Axelrod 1984, Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). Workers in group incentive plans may establish
and maintain a commitment to high work standards through cooperation and monitoring, which
can generate higher payouts for workers than in a non-cooperative setting (Weitzman and Kruse,
1990). This points to co-worker relations as a key ingredient in the effectiveness of employee
ownership. Preferences for employee ownership and profit sharing are likely to be low if
workers think co-workers are not interested in workplace performance and there is little potential
for productive cooperation under group-based rewards, and higher if they think co-workers are
interested in workplace performance and can achieve the cooperative equilibrium in the
prisoner’s dilemma game by working well together.
Finally, preferences for financial participation are likely to be shaped by attitudes towards
management. First, workers are unlikely to favor variable pay plans if they do not trust
managers to manage well so that there will be rewards to distribute to workers for their hard
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work. The second issue stems from informational asymmetries inherent in many incentive plans:
it can be difficult for workers to determine whether rewards under variable pay systems are being
calculated correctly and fairly by management, whereas this is easier under fixed wage contracts
since workers know exact pay levels ex ante. One of the objections of unions to profit sharing,
for example, is mistrust that managers will calculate profits in a way that properly rewards
workers for their performance (Zalusky 1986, Zalusky 1990). If workers do not trust managers
to calculate the payouts from financial participation in a competent and honest way, they will be
less interested in participating.
In sum, based on theory and past research, we expect attitudes towards financial
participation to be more positive among workers who are less risk averse, have more residual
control, and who trust management and think co-workers are more interested in workplace
performance.
There has been little published research on the topic of worker attitudes towards financial
participation. Kruse and Blasi (1999) summarize thirty public polls conducted between 1975 and
1997 with questions on general perceptions about financial participation systems, finding that a
majority of people expressed favorable views of employee ownership and its effects on
workplaces; for instance, in one survey 75 percent said they would like to work for an employeeowned and -controlled company, as opposed to a company owned by outside investors or
government, and in another survey 69 percent thought employee-owners work harder. A number
of studies have examined the effect of variable pay on overall job satisfaction among British
workers: Green and Heywood (2008) found that performance-related pay in general was
associated with increased job satisfaction, Brown and Sessions (2003) showed that workers who
participated in performance bonuses, share ownership, and profit sharing were more satisfied
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with their work environment, and McCausland et. al. (2005) found that the influence of
performance pay increased satisfaction for the more highly paid but lowered it for the less highly
paid. Drago, Estrin and Wooden (1992) found the use of individual and group bonuses to be a
positive determinant of job satisfaction in a sample of Australian workers. Cornelissen,
Heywood and Jirjahn (2008) showed that among German workers who received performance
pay, risk aversion was inversely correlated with overall job satisfaction.
Our paper contributes to the literature by investigating worker preference for various
forms of financial participation and how these preferences depend on key worker and workplace
characteristics.

III. DATA AND VARIABLES
We use the NBER Shared Capitalism Database, which consists of detailed information
collected from more than 40,000 employee surveys from 14 firms, to explore preferences for
different forms of employee ownership and variable pay. The NBER data comprise one of the
largest worker-level datasets on labor practices and worker sentiment ever collected. The survey
was conducted during 2002-2006 using a combination of web-based and paper survey methods,
and had a high response rate, averaging 53 percent over the 14 companies. The firms
participating in the survey included large multinationals with employment spanning North
America, South America, Europe and Asia, as well as smaller firms with mostly US employees.
The sample included eight firms in the manufacturing industry, two high-technology firms, and
four in the service industry. Three of the fourteen companies exceeded 10,000 employees, five
employed between 1,000 and 10,000 workers, and the remaining six employed fewer than 1,000
workers. All of the firms had employee ownership, profit sharing and variable pay programs,
though of varying forms and degrees: thirteen had individual bonus plans, nine had workgroup7

based or department-based performance bonus plans, eleven had broad-based profit sharing
plans, five had broad-based stock option plans, eight had standard employee stock ownership
plans (ESOPs), one had a 401(k) employee stock ownership program, four had employee stock
purchase plans, and three had 401(k)’s with company stock. Most had combinations of these
plans.
To investigate the role that risk aversion, residual control, and perceptions of co-workers
and management play in workers’ preferences for financial participation, we make use of a
unique set of questions asked in the NBER Shared Capitalism Survey capturing these concepts.
We now turn to a discussion of the key variables used in our empirical analyses.
Dependent Variables
We examine four variables reflecting worker preferences for financial participation as
dependent variables in our regression analyses. The first one captures worker preferences for
variable pay broadly and is based on a question asked in the NBER Shared Capitalism Survey
indicating the percentage of pay the respondent would like to receive as variable compensation
(which includes all forms of output-contingent pay that is based on individual, group and
company performance). Next we examine worker preferences for various forms of employee
ownership based on questions indicating the respondent’s preference for being paid at least in
part based on company performance (profit sharing, company stock, or stock options),
preference for the extent to which the respondent’s next pay increase depends on company
performance, and preference for getting a portion of compensation in the form of company stock
and stock options. These four dependent variables are defined formally below.
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Worker Preferences for Financial Participation:
Preference for Variable Pay
Proportion of pay the worker would like to receive as variable
compensation (13 firms surveyed)
Preference for Company-Based Dummy variable equaling 1 if the worker prefers that he or she
Incentives
be paid in part with a variable amount dependent on company
performance, through profit sharing, company stock, or stock
options; 0 if all fixed wage or salary, with no profit sharing,
company stock, or stock options (13 firms surveyed)
Preference for Company-Based Worker’s preference that his or her next pay increase come in
Incentives in Next Pay Increase the form of 1 = All fixed wages, with no profit sharing,
company stock, or stock options; 2 = Split between fixed
wages and profit sharing, company stock, or stock options; 3 =
All in the form of profit sharing, company stock, or stock
options (5 firms surveyed)
Preference for Stock Over
Worker’s preference for getting some of his or her
Cash Incentives
compensation from company stock and stock options as
opposed to a cash incentive plan on a 1 (cash incentive plan) to
5 (company stock and stock options) scale (3 firms surveyed)

Key Independent Variables
The key independent variables in our analysis are those that capture worker risk aversion,
residual control, and perceptions of co-workers and management.
One of the unique features of the NBER Survey is the presence of information on
individual-level risk aversion, which plays a central role in theoretical models of the employeeemployer relationship, but is rarely available in existing datasets. Our primary measure of the
extent to which the worker is averse to risk is based on the NBER Survey question ―Some people
like to take risks and others dislike taking risks. Where would you place yourself on a scale of
how much you like or dislike taking risks, where 0 is hating to take any kind of risk and 10 is
loving to take risks?‖, from which we define variable Risk Averse such that values greater than or
equal to 7 on this scale correspond to ―low risk aversion‖, greater than 3 and less than 7 is
―medium risk aversion‖, and less than or equal to 3 is ―high risk aversion‖. As discussed earlier,
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people with lower wealth and base salary will generally be more averse to financial risk since
pay variability that results in pay reduction is more likely to force them to cut back on
necessities, so we also examine the worker’s annual base salary and family wealth under the
framework of risk aversion.
Risk Aversion Variables:
Risk Averse
Worker’s self-assessment of his risk preference, where 1 = Low risk
aversion; 2 = Medium risk aversion; 3 = High risk aversion.
Base Pay
Worker’s annual base pay the previous year excluding overtime, bonuses
and commissions (in thousands)
Wealth
Assets of the worker and the worker’s spouse including the value of their
house minus the mortgage, their vehicles, stocks and mutual funds, cash,
checking accounts, retirement accounts including 401(k) and pension assets
(in thousands)

The second key element that is likely to shape attitudes towards financial participation is
residual control, or the ability to influence one’s potential for higher income, which will depend
on worker skills and opportunities to influence workplace performance through employee
involvement in decision-making, training, and assurance that the worker can reap the rewards of
higher performance through job security. These variables, which we group under the heading
residual control, are defined below.
Residual Control Variables:
Decision-Making Dummy variable equaling 1 if the worker is involved in organized
workplace decision-making through teams, committees or task forces that
address workplace issues such as product quality, cost cutting,
productivity, health and safety; 0 otherwise
Training
Dummy variable equaling 1 if the worker received any formal training
from the employer in the last 12 months, such as in classes or seminars
sponsored by the employer; 0 otherwise
Job Security
Dummy variable equaling 1 if the worker’s response to the question
―Thinking about the next twelve months, how likely do you think it is that
you will lose your job or be laid off?‖ is ―not at all likely‖ or ―not too
likely‖; 0 if the worker’s response is ―very likely‖ or ―fairly likely‖.
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As discussed earlier, preferences for company performance-based rewards in particular
are likely to depend on workers’ perceptions about whether their co-workers are committed to
workplace performance and whether they trust management to distribute payouts from
workplace rewards correctly. We therefore include the below two independent variables.
Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management:
Co-Worker Interest and Involvement Worker’s perception of his or her co-workers’ interest and
involvement in company-wide issues on a 1-7 scale, with 1
indicating little interest and involvement and 7 indicating
great interest and involvement
Management Trustworthiness
Worker’s perception of the trustworthiness of his company
in keeping its promises on a 0-4 scale, with 0 indicating not
trustworthy and 4 indicating highly trustworthy

Control Variables
Beyond the variables that are central to our analysis, all of our regression models include
a rich array of worker and workplace characteristics as control variables. These are worker
demographic variables including gender, age, and education level; and job characteristics
variables including occupation, managerial level, firm tenure, whether the worker is closely
supervised, and whether pay is at or above market level. We also control for the ease with which
workers can observe their co-workers’ effort, since this is likely to influence the extent to which
perceptions about how involved co-workers are in company issues (Co-Worker Interest and
Involvement), one of the main independent variables we consider, affects preferences for shared
capitalism. Fuller definitions and descriptive statistics of these control variables are provided in
the Appendix.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
As a first step in our empirical analysis, we will examine unconditional means of our
main dependent variables to explore preferences over financial participation broadly across all
workers in our sample. Second, we will examine how preferences for financial participation
vary with worker risk aversion, residual control, and perceptions of co-workers and management
by estimating cross-sectional regressions of attitudes on these main independent variables,
controlling for the array of worker and workplace characteristics described above. We will
estimate least squares, probit, and multinomial probit models, depending on whether the
dependent variable is a continuous, dummy, or multi-valued variable, respectively.
It is important to note that these cross-sectional regression models do not capture causal
relationships, but rather conditional correlations among the variables of interest. For example, it
is possible that workers with a greater preference for financial participation sort themselves into
firms with greater use of financial participation, greater residual control for workers, and
workplace climates with high levels of trust. We investigated this possibility by also estimating
regressions that included firm fixed effects, with very similar results for the variables of interest;
in the paper we report the results without firm effects to take advantage of both within- and
between-firm variation. It also remains possible that within a firm, workers will be sorted into
jobs based on personal characteristics correlated with preferences over financial participation. It
may be, for example, that being in a decision-making team does not create greater interest in
financial participation, but workers with greater interest in financial participation select
themselves into positions that are part of decision-making teams. Even in the latter case, finding
a positive relationship strongly suggests an important linkage between residual control and
residual returns for workers. So while we cannot definitively determine causality (as with most
non-experimental data), our results will nonetheless shed important light on how preferences for
12

financial participation are related to worker risk aversion, residual control and workplace
climate, and the conditions under which variable pay plans are viewed positively by workers and
are most likely to be effective.

V. UNCONDITIONAL STATISTICS
Summary statistics for the main variables used in our empirical analyses are shown in
Table 1, along with distribution charts for selected variables. Most workers desire between 0 and
30 percent of their compensation to be comprised of variable pay, though there is considerable
variation in this preference across workers as illustrated in Figure 1, with an average of 20
percent (Preference for Variable Pay). When asked whether workers prefer to be paid at least in
part with variable pay that depends on company performance through profit sharing, company
stock or stock options, as opposed to getting all fixed salary, a vast majority of respondents, 78
percent, say they prefer to have some company performance-dependent variable pay (Preference
for Company-Based Incentives). Only 27 percent of workers would like their next pay increase
to come in the form of all fixed wages with no profit sharing, company stock or stock options,
while 60 percent would like a combination of the two types, and 13 percent would like their next
raise to consist entirely of profit sharing, company stock or stock options (Preference for
Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase). Workers’ preferences in favor of companyperformance-based pay is also evident in the distribution of the variable Preference for Stock
Over Cash Incentives, where most workers picked categories 3 and 4 on a scale of 1 to 5
indicating their preference for getting some of their compensation from stock and stock options
as opposed to a cash incentive plan.
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VI. WHICH WORKERS PREFER FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION?
The above discussion showed that most workers want at least a part of their
compensation to be output-contingent, and prefer to be paid at least in part based on company
performance. But it may well be that there is variation across these attitudes by the worker’s
degree of risk aversion, residual control, and perceptions of co-workers and management. We
now explore what types of workers prefer variable pay, and what kinds of variable pay they
prefer, by estimating regressions of our various preference measures on the main independent
variables of interest, and controls.
Table 2 illustrates least squares regression results for Preference for Variable Pay,
indicating the proportion of total pay the worker would like to receive as variable compensation,
and provides strong support for our hypothesis on the relationship between risk aversion and
preferences for variable pay: the proportion of compensation workers would like to receive as
variable pay is negatively related with their degree of risk aversion—an increase in risk aversion
from the ―low‖ category to the ―high‖ category is associated with a decrease in the desired
proportion of pay comprised of variable compensation of over 8 percentage points, on average.
Also, the proportion of compensation workers would like to receive as variable pay is
statistically significantly positively related with family wealth and base salary which can insulate
workers against fluctuations in compensation created by variable pay. Second, there is some
support for the hypothesis that workers have greater preference for residual rewards when they
also have residual control—the proportion of pay the worker desires in his or her compensation
is significantly positively related with employee involvement in workplace decision-making, and
is also positively related with formal job training and job security though these last two estimates
are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Third, in support of our hypothesis on
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perceptions of co-workers and management, preference for variable pay is positively related with
co-worker interest and involvement in company-wide issues and trust in management, and both
of these relationships are statistically significant at the one percent level, indicating that workers
are more interested in shared capitalism when they can trust others in the workplace.1,2
Table 3 illustrates the probit marginal effects for Prob(Preference for Company-Based
Incentives=1), the probability that the worker prefers that he or she be paid in part with variable
pay based on company performance (such as profit sharing, company stock, and stock options)
over being paid fully in the form of fixed salary. We find even stronger evidence in favor of our
hypotheses here than in the previous table: preference for company-performance-contingent pay
is negatively associated with risk aversion, positively associated with family wealth and base
salary, positively associated with all three measures of residual control, and positively associated
with confidence in co-workers and management, as predicted.
We next turn to workers’ preferences over the portion of pay increases comprised of
company-performance-based variable pay by focusing on the three-valued Preference for
Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase, which equals 1 if the worker prefers that his or
her next pay increase is comprised of all fixed wages, with no profit sharing, company stock, or

1

Apart from these main results on how preferences for variable pay depend on risk aversion, residual control and
perceptions of co-workers and management, we also uncovered some interesting findings on the relationships
between the control variables and Preference for Variable Pay. For example, women have a lower preference for
variable pay, which aligns with evidence from past studies using laboratory and field experiments that women tend
to be more risk averse than men (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, Dohmen et. al. 2007, Dohmen and Falk 2006). We
also find that workers in sales and customer service occupations have the strongest preference in favor of variable
pay, a possible explanation for which is that output is more readily linkable to individual performance than for
workers in many other occupations (e.g., number of units sold or number of customers assisted), and this reduces
problems of free-riding so that such workers may view output-contingent compensation as a more fruitful reward for
their effort. Among other interesting results is that workers with longer tenure at the firm prefer a lower share of
variable pay, supporting the idea that workers who are closer to retirement are often loathe to introduce risk into
their compensation as they have less time remaining in the labor market to recoup potential losses. To streamline
and focus our discussion around the key variables of interest (risk aversion, residual control, perceptions of coworkers and management) we do not present these results in the paper, but they are available from the authors.
2
Since Preference for Variable Pay has a lower bound of zero we also estimated an analogous regression using a
tobit model and obtained very similar results.
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stock options; 2 if it is split between fixed wages and profit sharing, company stock, or stock
options; and 3 if it is all in the form of profit sharing, company stock, or stock options. Table 4
illustrates marginal effects from a multinomial probit regression of Preference for CompanyBased Incentives in Next Pay Increase on our risk aversion, residual control, and co-worker and
management perceptions variables, and worker controls, with the three columns corresponding to
the probability that a worker chooses values 1, 2, or 3, respectively. We find that workers who
are more risk averse are less likely to want their next pay increase to be partly or completely
comprised of company-performance-based pay, and more likely to prefer that it is entirely
comprised of fixed wages, corroborating our hypothesized relationship between risk aversion and
attitudes toward financial participation. On the other hand, wealth and salary do not exhibit
statistically significant relationships with Preference for Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay
Increase. Table 4 provides mixed evidence supporting the notion that residual control improves
preference for residual returns: job training and job security are associated with a higher
likelihood of preferring one’s next pay increase to be comprised of both company performance
related pay and fixed wages, though the relationship between employee involvement in decisionmaking and Preference for Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase is not statistically
significant. Finally, though trust in management is associated with wanting a portion of one’s
pay raise to be contingent on company performance, co-worker interest and involvement in
company-wide issues does not have a statistically significant relation with Preference for
Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase.
Table 5 shows results from a least squares regression of preference for receiving some
compensation from company stock and stock options as opposed to a cash incentive plan on a 1
to 5 scale (Preference for Stock Over Cash Incentives). We can interpret this as capturing

16

whether the respondent prefers having stock or cash in his or her pocket. The worker’s selfassessment of his or her own risk aversion is strongly negatively correlated with preference for
stock-based compensation as opposed to cash incentives, as expected. However, family wealth
and base salary have a statistically significant positive, albeit small, correlation with preference
for stock-based compensation over cash incentives. All of our residual control variables and
management and co-worker trust variables are positively related to Preference for Stock Over
Cash Incentives, in support of our hypotheses.3

VII. CONCLUSION
This paper uses the NBER Shared Capitalism Survey to study a relatively unexplored
topic in the research on participatory pay schemes, namely worker preferences for employee
ownership, profit sharing and variable pay, and how these preferences depend on three key
worker and workplace characteristics: worker risk aversion, residual control, and perceptions of
co-workers and management.
We find that, on average, workers desire around 20 percent of their compensation to be
comprised of variable pay. Most workers prefer to be paid at least in part based on company
performance, through profit sharing, company stock, or stock options, and in particular they
prefer getting stock and stock options as opposed to cash incentives.
Furthermore, our regression results clearly indicate that risk aversion is a major factor
reducing preferences for variable pay plans. This is supported not only by the strong coefficients
on the risk aversion variable, but also by the coefficients on two key employee characteristics
that are expected to be related to risk preferences, namely base pay and family wealth.
3

As a robustness check we also estimated all of our regressions with firm fixed effects, and the results were very
similar to the baseline results we report here, both in magnitude and significance. These additional results are
available from the authors.
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An important finding, though, is that workplace policies help to improve worker
perceptions of variable pay. The finding that workers are more likely to prefer performancebased pay if they have decision-making power, formal job training, and job security at their
workplace supports the theory that residual control and residual returns are complementary.
Future research would be valuable on the form of this relationship (e.g., linear or non-linear,
including whether there are threshold effects), and whether complementary residual control
practices can help make shared capitalism more appealing to groups who are more risk-averse.
Workplace culture also is a key variable. Workers are unlikely to favor variable pay
plans if they do not trust managers (either to manage well so that there will be rewards, or to
calculate rewards accurately and honestly). Their attitudes are also influenced by how they
perceive their co-workers: if they have little reason to expect their co-workers to perform well
under a performance-based pay plan, they will not be optimistic about the prospect for rewards.
The findings on workplace policies and trust of co-worker and managers indicate that
preferences over variable pay plans are not determined by any fixed mindset or personal
characteristic of workers, but appear to depend on the context in which the plans are
implemented. This is consistent with research on the performance effects of employee
ownership and profit sharing, which shows that while these plans are associated with higher
performance effects on average, there is substantial dispersion in estimated effects across and
within samples (Doucialiagos, 2005; Kaarsemakar, 2006; Freeman, 2007). This dispersion is
likely to be explained in part by employees’ neutral or negative reactions in workplaces that do
not provide supportive environments, in contrast to positive reactions with increased employee
effort and cooperation when the environment is supportive. Research has begun to identify how
specific workplace policies condition the effects of group incentive plans (Kruse et al., 2010).
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Further research that delves into the role of workplace policies and cultures in financial
participation would be valuable in determining how and when these plans can affect performance
and worker welfare, and the likelihood that they may expand in the 21st century.
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APPENDIX
Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of Worker and Workplace Control Variables
Variable
Female
Age
No High School
High School

Some College

Associate Degree
College
Grad School

Production
Administrative
Support
Professional and
Technical
Sales and Customer
Service
Lower Management

Middle
Management
Upper Management
At Market Salary

Tenure
Hours

Definition
1 if worker is female; 0 otherwise
Worker age
1 if worker does not hold a high school
degree; 0 otherwise
1 if worker’s highest educational degree is
a high school degree including GED; 0
otherwise
1 if worker has attended some college but
has not received a bachelor’s degree; 0
otherwise
1 if worker’s highest educational degree is
an associate’s degree; 0 otherwise
1 if worker’s highest educational degree is
a bachelor’s degree; 0 otherwise
1 if worker’s highest educational degree is
a master’s, professional or doctoral
degree; 0 otherwise
1 if worker’s occupation is production; 0
otherwise
1 if worker’s occupation is administrative
support; 0 otherwise
1 if worker’s occupation is professional
and technical (including engineers and
scientists); 0 otherwise
if worker’s occupation is sales and
customer service; 0 otherwise
1 if worker’s occupation is lower
management (including front-line
supervisors); 0 otherwise
1 if worker’s occupation is middle
management (including managers and
directors); 0 otherwise
1 if worker’s occupation is top
management (executives); 0 otherwise
1 if the worker believes that his annual
base salary at the firm is at or above the
going market rate for employees in other
companies with similar experience and
job descriptions in the region; 0 otherwise
Worker’s tenure at the firm, in years
Worker’s weekly hours worked

Mean
0.312
40.933

S.D.
0.463
10.503

Obs.
38,325
36,791

0.037

0.189

35,758

0.230

0.421

35,758

0.217

0.412

35,758

0.084

0.277

35,758

0.280

0.449

35,758

0.138

0.344

39,436

0.434

0.496

45,816

0.061

0.238

45,816

0.295

0.456

45,816

0.085

0.280

45,816

0.101

0.302

45,816

0.075

0.263

45,816

0.022

0.147

45,816

0.592
9.540
45.789

0.491
8.979
8.137

36,236
45,755
45,696
20

Close Supervision

See Co-Workers

Measure of how closely the worker is
supervised on a 0-10 scale, with 0
indicating that the worker works
independently of close supervision and 10
indicating the worker is closely supervised
Worker’s rating of how easy it is for him
to see whether his co-workers are working
well or poorly on a 1-10 scale

3.347

2.631

45,978

6.784

2.740

45,874
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TABLES
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Means, Standard Deviations, and Sample Sizes
Variable
Mean
S.D.
Obs.
Dependent Variables
Preference for Variable Pay
19.560 18.368 12,804
Preference for Company-Based Incentives
0.783
0.412 13,543
Preference for Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase
1.862
0.616 26,626
Preference for Stock Over Cash Incentives
3.076
1.277
7,994
Risk Aversion
Risk Averse
1.786
0.755 41,695
Base Pay
54.820 41.997 30,457
Wealth
288.327 586.784 32,466
Residual Control
Decision-Making
0.348
0.476 42,865
Training
0.562
0.496 43,067
Job Security
0.843
0.364 43,807
Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management
Co-worker Interest and Involvement
4.217
1.599 42,809
Management Trustworthiness
2.328
1.152 42,437
Note: Based on the NBER Shared Capitalism Survey of N = 46,907 workers.
Panel B: Distribution Tables
Preference for Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase:
1 (all fixed wage)
2
3 (all company-performance-based pay)
Total

Freq.
7,143
16,014
3,469
26,626

Percent
26.83
60.14
13.03
100

Preference for Stock Over Cash Incentives:
Freq.
1 (cash incentives)
1,229
2
1,279
3
2,412
4
1,804
5 (stock, options)
1,270
Total
7,994
Note: Based on the NBER Shared Capitalism Survey of N = 46,907 workers.

Percent
15.37
16
30.17
22.57
15.89
100

25

.02
0

.01

Density

.03

.04

Figure 1: Kernel Density for Preference for Variable Pay
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Note: Based on the NBER Shared Capitalism Survey of N = 46,907 workers. We
use an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwith 2.0128.
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Table 2: Relationship Between Preference for Variable Pay and Risk Aversion, Residual
Control, and Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management
Dependent Variable: Preference for Variable Pay
Risk Aversion
Risk Averse
Base Pay
Wealth
Residual Control
Decision-Making
Training
Job Security

-4.173***
(0.265)
0.051***
(0.005)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.974**
(0.399)
0.671
(0.455)
0.626
(0.734)

Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management
Co-Worker Interest and Involvement

0.427***
(0.127)
Management Trustworthiness
0.720***
(0.188)
Worker and Workplace Controls
YES
Constant
10.580***
(2.678)
Observations
8289
Adjusted R-squared
0.220
Note: Results are from a least squares regression model. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. The model also
includes the full set of worker and workplace controls described in the Data and Variables
Section.
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Table 3: Relationship Between Preference for Company-Based Incentives and Risk Aversion,
Residual Control, and Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management
Pr(Preference for Company-Based Incentives=1)
Risk Aversion
Risk Averse
Base Pay
Wealth
Residual Control
Decision-Making
Training
Job Security

-0.046***
(0.005)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.031***
(0.007)
0.027***
(0.008)
0.034***
(0.013)

Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management
Co-Worker Interest and Involvement

0.009***
(0.002)
Management Trustworthiness
0.021***
(0.003)
Worker and Workplace Controls
YES
Observations
8580
Pseudo R-squared
0.202
Note: Results are probit marginal effects for Prob(Preference for Company-Based Incentives=1)
evaluated at the mean of the independent variable or, for binary independent variables, the
change in the predicted Prob(Preference for Company-Based Incentives=1) when the
independent variable increases from 0 to 1 (evaluating all other covariates at their means).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05
level; *** at the .01 level. The model also includes the full set of worker and workplace
controls described in the Data and Variables Section.
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Table 4: Relationship Between Preference for Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase
and Risk Aversion, Residual Control, and Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management
Pr(Preference for Pr(Preference for Pr(Preference for
Company-Based Company-Based Company-Based
Incentives
Incentives
Incentives in
in Next Pay
in Next Pay
Next Pay
Increase=1)
Increase =2)
Increase =3)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Risk Aversion
Risk Averse
Base Pay
Wealth
Residual Control
Decision-Making
Training
Job Security

0.052***
(0.005)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

-0.032***
(0.006)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)

-0.020***
(0.004)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)

-0.012
(0.008)
-0.021***
(0.008)
-0.006
(0.012)

0.004
(0.009)
0.028***
(0.009)
0.025*
(0.013)

0.008
(0.005)
-0.007
(0.005)
-0.018**
(0.008)

Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management
Co-Worker Interest and Involvement

0.001
-0.002
0.001
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.002)
Management Trustworthiness
-0.026***
0.024***
0.002
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.003)
Worker and Workplace Controls
YES
YES
YES
Observations
13363
13363
13363
Note: Results in each column are multinomial probit marginal effects for Prob(Preference for
Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase =1), Prob(Preference for Company-Based
Incentives in Next Pay Increase =2), and Prob(Preference for Company-Based Incentives in Next
Pay Increase =3), respectively, evaluated at the mean of the independent variable or, for binary
independent variables, the change in the predicted probability when the independent variable
increases from 0 to 1 (evaluating all other covariates at their means). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.
The models also include the full set of worker and workplace controls described in the Data and
Variables Section.
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Table 5: Relationship Between Preference for Stock Over Cash Incentives and Risk Aversion,
Residual Control, and Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management
Dependent Variable: Preference for Stock Over
Cash Incentives
Risk Aversion
Risk Averse
Base Pay
Wealth
Residual Control
Decision-Making
Training
Job Security

-0.231***
(0.022)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.140***
(0.031)
0.102***
(0.037)
0.175***
(0.058)

Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management
Co-Worker Interest and Involvement

0.075***
(0.010)
Management Trustworthiness
0.162***
(0.015)
Worker and Workplace Controls
YES
Constant
1.373***
(0.248)
Observations
6766
Adjusted R-squared
0.151
Note: Results are from a least squares regression model. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. The model also
includes the full set of worker and workplace controls described in the Data and Variables
Section.
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